

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

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THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Monday, 3 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. H. DEAN

(United States of America)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. V. ISLIRLIEV

Burma

U TUN SHEIN

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. E. BURNS

Mr. J. E. G. HARRY

Mr. J. P. M. BELL

Mr. E. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

ATO ELDDIS ALAMAYEHU

ATO H. HAMID

ATO M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL

Mr. A. S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-RECHINI

Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. K. LACHS  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK  
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. H. FLORESCU  
Mr. N. ECOVESCU  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Baron C. H. von PLATEN  
Mr. M. STAHL  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A. A. ROSCHIN  
Mr. I. G. USACHEV  
Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. M. H. EL-ZAYYAT  
Mr. S. AHMED  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. D. N. BRINSON  
Mr. E. C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. A. H. DEAN  
Mr. C. C. STELLE  
Mr. D. E. MARK  
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the eighty-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

THE ELECTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): In my capacity as Chairman of this meeting and as co-Chairman of the Conference I should like to express on behalf of all the nations represented here what I am sure is the very general feeling of satisfaction at the unanimous election of U Thant of Burma as Secretary-General of the United Nations. I am sure that his election augurs well for the peace of the world and for the work of the United Nations and I should like to send to him the unanimous good wishes of all present at this meeting. Hearing no opinion to the contrary, I assume that to be the wish of this Conference.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation associates itself with the congratulations which have just been offered by our Chairman to U Thant on his unanimous election by the Security Council and the General Assembly as Secretary-General of the United Nations. In the message which the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, sent to U Thant in connexion with his appointment to this high office, he expressed the conviction that U. Thant's political experience and the concern which he shows for the maintenance of peace among nations will enable him to carry out successfully the functions of Secretary-General of the United Nations. One can say with certainty that precisely these qualities of U Thant ensured his unanimous election to this high and very responsible post. The Soviet delegation, like the Eighteen-Nation Committee as a whole, which has been entrusted with the very serious and responsible task of solving the problem of disarmament, offers its congratulations to U Thant on the occasion of his election to the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations and expresses its sincere wishes for complete success in his responsible office. The Soviet delegation fully supports and welcomes the proposal to send a congratulatory telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, on behalf of the Committee.

Mr. LALL (India): It gives the delegation of India great pleasure to associate itself with the remarks which have been made by our two co-Chairmen regarding the unanimous election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations. We do not wish to repeat the sentiments which have been expressed, as time is precious, but we share them fully and I should like to add that we see in this election also the important fact of agreement between all the Member States of the United Nations

(Mr. L., India)

upon an issue involving a matter of principle. We in this Committee are dealing with important matters of principle, and we realize that agreement on them can come only in the same spirit of accommodation that has led to the unanimous election of U Thant, and we hope that the Committee, in forwarding its congratulations to U Thant, will bear in mind that the same spirit which led to his election is the spirit which we need here in our work.

r. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation is very happy to concur with the proposal which has just been made by the Chairman with regard to the dispatching of a congratulatory message to U Thant.

Speaking as the representative of Canada, I would say that it is a matter of the greatest satisfaction to my country that U Thant, who has served for the past year with such distinction as the acting head of the executive branch of the United Nations Organization, should now be confirmed in that office for the full term from November 1961.

As we know, this past year has been a very difficult one for U Thant. He has had to face very complex problems indeed; and he has dealt with them with courage and wisdom. We know of his great interest in the field of disarmament -- and in particular in the cessation of nuclear weapon tests -- and we welcome the statement contained in his speech of acceptance that he:

"may be able to play a role, however humble, in the easing of tension

and in bridging the gulf between the major Powers." (L/PV.1182 (provisional). p.16)

We are also happy to underscore his wise remark that:

"Then the future of mankind itself, is at stake, no country or interest group can afford to take a rigid stand, or claim that its position is the only right one, and that others must take it or leave it." (ibid. p.17)

As the representative of India has remarked, there are important conclusions to be drawn from such a statement for our work at this Conference.

I think it would also be appropriate to extend congratulations on behalf of the delegation of Canada to our eminent colleague representing the country which U Thant formerly represented at the United Nations.

Finally, we would join other speakers in expressing the earnest and heartfelt wish that U Thant may have all success in the discharge of his very responsible and difficult functions in the high office to which he has been called.

Mr. El-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic): I am grateful for the way in which what is in the minds of all of us has already been so clearly expressed, thus making it unnecessary for us to take up too much of the Committee's time.

My delegation would, however, like to express its gratification and pleasure at the unanimous appointment by the United Nations General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, of U Thant as Secretary-General.

In addressing our congratulations to U Thant, and our gratitude to Burma the country which produced him, we should also like to think of his predecessor, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, and to express our feeling to the representative of Sweden. We should be grateful if the representatives of both countries would convey to their Governments the sentiments of the delegation of the United Arab Republic on this occasion.

Also, we should like Mr. Epstein to convey to the Secretary-General, whom he represents here, our expression of pleasure and of complete confidence that he will keep our Organization firmly on the course he has set for it in the cause of peace and security.

Mr. EDBERG (Sweden): The Swedish delegation wishes to join in the congratulations to U Thant on the high office to which he has been unanimously elected.

To us who represent the country of Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, it is a great satisfaction to know that his work, which was so abruptly brought to an end in September last year by the nocturnal tragedy in the North Rhodesian bush, will be carried on by a man like U Thant, who is so devoted to the high ideals of the United Nations and so inspired by the will to serve mankind in a critical time.

During one year in which he has served as Acting Secretary-General U Thant has been able to show his profile to the world: quiet, with deep roots in his Buddhist philosophy, he has appeared as a man with great political wisdom and strength of will, paired with flexibility in his approach to difficult problems, with an impressive courage of his convictions.

When accepting his extended mandate U Thant expressed his belief -- as has already been stated here -- that he may be able

"to play a role, however humble, in the easing of tensions and in bridging the gulf between the major Powers."

We who represent a small non-aligned country in another corner of the world want to express our sincere hope that this distinguished son of Burma will be successful in

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

his great and onerous task. We are particularly glad to note, in this connexion, the active interest which the new Secretary-General, from the very first moment, has shown in this Conference and in its work.

We fully support the proposal that this Conference should send a telegram of congratulations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I wish to express, on behalf of the Mexican delegation and on my own behalf, our satisfaction at the election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations and to associate myself with all that has been said concerning him by the previous speakers. The fact that the Security Council, with the concurring votes of all its permanent members, should have recommended his appointment to the General Assembly, where he was unanimously elected by the Members of the United Nations, is a striking tribute to U Thant and a recognition of his qualities.

The United Nations can congratulate itself on being able to rely for the next four years on U Thant's competence, prudence, energy and devotion to the cause of peace. This is a time of great changes in science and technology; we are also witnessing an irresistible movement in favour of the freedom and independence of peoples. The existing differences between nations are numerous and dangerous, but we can rely for their solution on the unswerving impartiality and constant vigilance of the Secretary-General, who has shown during his period of office as Acting Secretary-General that he will neither seek nor accept instructions from any Power and that he has no other aspiration than to serve the highest interests of the United Nations within the framework of the Charter.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): There is little that I can add to the expressions of pleasure which we had already heard and which I am sure we all endorse. I would only say that it is a deep personal pleasure to me to know that this election has taken place, and particularly the terms and the manner in which it has taken place. I would endorse very strongly the words of the representative of India about the value of an example here of co-operation among the nations in agreeing on the election of U Thant in the manner in which they have.

As one who has had the privilege of working closely with U Thant on a number of occasions, I would say how gratified I am that the manner of his election endorses so fully the feeling that one cannot help but have when working with him of the strength of his character, which emanates in every way. I am sure we would all agree



(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

that his stature has grown during the difficult period in which he has already occupied the office as Acting Secretary-General. I am sure that we are all delighted to be able now to drop the word "Acting" and to look on him as the Secretary-General and as a man occupying a difficult post -- one which he is occupying at very considerable sacrifice to himself, of course. Let no one forget that. The sacrifice of one's personal life, in accepting such a difficult and onerous duty is something which we should all deeply respect and be very thankful for.

On behalf of myself and my delegation I wish him every possible success in this most difficult task which he has accepted. If he goes forward with the good wishes of us all then I am sure that he will entirely fulfil the high hopes which we all have in his election.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): On behalf of the delegation of Poland I wish to join you, Mr. Chairman, in what you have said concerning the election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations. This election is indeed an event which should make us rejoice, for by it we have secured for this most important post a man of the highest quality, both in intellect and character. This may be an opportune moment -- as some of the speakers who have preceded me have indicated -- for reflection on decisions concerning man and matter. The former are frequently much more difficult than the latter, for when choosing a man for very high office one frequently decides on the matter itself. That is why this wise decision by the United Nations should be an encouragement to us in our work. It shows that in this world of ours, in which we face so many complicated and difficult issues, we can still reach agreement on very important problems when issues such as this are at stake. Let us, therefore, accept the action taken in New York last Friday as an example for ourselves. It is only fitting that we should wish the new Secretary-General, in the highly complex and responsible task he faces, all possible success.

Mr. ASSUMPCAO DE ARAUJO (Brazil) (translation from French): I should like to associate myself with the speakers who have just congratulated Mr. Thant on his unanimous election to the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations for a regular term of office. We should have every confidence and place every hope in Mr. Thant whose work as Acting Secretary-General has been so distinguished and so valuable.

Ato HADDIS ALMAYEHU (Ethiopia): I wish to express the gratification of my delegation at the election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations. I had the distinct honour of working with him in the United Nations in New York. I found him to be a devoted servant dedicated to the cause of the United Nations, and I am sure he is the best choice available to the Organization. I hope that he will be successful in the difficult task that he has accepted, and I wish to concur in your suggestion, Mr. Chairman, that this Conference should send a congratulatory message to U Thant.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): On behalf of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, I should also like to associate myself, Mr. Chairman, with the warm congratulations which you and other speakers have expressed on the occasion of Mr. Thant's election to the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations.

We are particularly happy to do so for our delegation has, like others, had occasion to work for quite a long time with the man who has been chosen as Secretary-General and to appreciate his qualities. We should also like to express our hope that the United Nations administrative machinery will set to work under his direction to create the necessary conditions for solving the problems with which the world of today is confronted and which it finds so difficult to settle.

We also hope that Mr. Thant's great abilities will contribute to the solution of outstanding problems, and that his negotiating talents will be used in this field, and more particularly in the field of general and complete disarmament which is the task of our Conference.

We should like to take the opportunity to congratulate the Burmese delegation, sitting beside us at this table, on having possessed a representative so highly qualified that he has been elected to the exalted position of Secretary-General of the United Nations. I join in this general tribute and am fully in agreement with the proposal to send him a telegram of congratulations on behalf of our Conference.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): On behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation I, too, should like to associate myself with what has been said by the previous speakers and to express our satisfaction at the unanimous election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations. We have a high regard for his impartiality, experience and personal qualities. We congratulate him on his election to the responsible post of Secretary-General and wish him further success in his future work. I fully support your proposal, Mr. Chairman, to send a congratulatory telegram to the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like in my turn to associate myself with the congratulations which other delegations have expressed on Mr. Thant's election to the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations. I think this election is a good omen for international reconciliation in general and also for the success of the work which we have to carry out here.

The unanimity of Mr. Thant's election shows that the United Nations has been strengthened and can work better in the cause of peace. The Italian delegation's good wishes go with Mr. Thant in his work as Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Romanian delegation I should like to join you in congratulating U Thant on his appointment as the Secretary-General of the United Nations. As you know, the Romanian delegation in New York was one of the six sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by the Security Council to the General Assembly recommending the election of U Thant. Here again we should like to congratulate U Thant and convey to him our best wishes for the successful accomplishment of his task.

Mr. CBI (Nigeria): On behalf of my delegation I should like to join in the expression of gratification and satisfaction at the unanimous election of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations. This signal expression of unanimity and agreement will, it is to be hoped, be extended so as to facilitate our complex task here.

U TUN SHEIN (Burma): Certainly I am not going to join in extolling U Thant, for that would be highly immodest on the part of my delegation. All I wish to say is that all of us -- the twenty million people of Burma as well as the Revolutionary Government of the Union of Burma -- are extremely glad that Member States of the United Nations have reposed their trust and confidence in U Thant in electing him their full-time Secretary-General. We are grateful to each and every Member State for the support extended. We are confident that he will endeavour to the best of his ability to discharge his heavy responsibilities in the interests of peace, which the world so badly needs. At the same time, we are not unmindful of the fact that, in thus endorsing U Thant's appointment, nations of the world are convinced that the Union of Burma, a non-nuclear and non-armed country, steadfastly pursues a policy of peace and non-alignment.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should now like to call upon Mr. Epstein, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

Mr. EYSTEIN (Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General): It is a most gratifying experience to listen to this unanimous outpouring of sentiments of solidarity and support and good wishes for the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In addition to the telegram which I am sure this Committee will decide to send to the Secretary-General, I myself shall immediately convey to him the text of the remarks made in this Committee today, and I am sure he will find much in them of encouragement and much to sustain him in the difficult work that lies ahead of him.

One or two of the representatives have quoted sentences from the Secretary-General's speech of acceptance and, with your permission Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can arrange to circulate informally to members of the Committee the full text of that speech.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I take it that it is the unanimous sentiment of the Conference that I, as the Chairman of the day, should ask the Secretariat to prepare a congratulatory telegram on behalf of the Conference to the Secretary-General, appropriately expressing the felicitations of the Conference, and also that, as Mr. Epstein has suggested, we should send to His Excellency a transcript of these proceedings so that he may see the precise words which each of the representatives here has spoken today on the subject of his election to the office of Secretary-General of the United Nations.

It was so decided.

#### CONTINUATION OF THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Pursuant to the discussion that took place at our last meeting, the two co-Chairmen have met and it is their recommendation that, subject to the approval of the Conference, today's meeting and the meeting to be held on Wednesday 5 December -- that is, the eighty-sixth and eighty-seventh plenary meetings -- should be devoted to the subject of nuclear testing. It is further recommended that, if the list of speakers on that subject has not been exhausted at the close of the eighty-seventh plenary meeting the discussion should continue at the eighty-eighth plenary meeting, to be held on 7 December, until there are no further speakers on nuclear testing, after which the subject of general and complete disarmament will be taken up.

If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Committee decides to accept those recommendations.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): We shall turn now to the subject of nuclear testing.

U TUN SEBIN (Burma): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first occasion on which I have taken the floor in this debate, may I say how honoured and privileged I feel to be participating in the work of this Committee. May I also convey to you and to the other representatives my sincere thanks for the kind words expressed in welcoming me to your midst.

The question of general and complete disarmament is a vital issue for mankind's survival. However, my delegation submits that there can be no realistic programme of general and complete disarmament unless the problem is contained, unless we prevent it from growing even as we consider it. We have taken this stand all along. In fact members of the Committee will recall that the Burmese Foreign Minister stated in this Committee:

"As my delegation sees it, the search for disarmament consists not only in looking for agreed ways and means of reducing and finally eliminating existing armed forces and armaments: we must also ensure that our task does not grow while we are busily engaged in looking for a solution." (ENDC/PV.6, p.24)

That was stated on 21 March 1962, at the very outset of the Conference. It is for this reason that we have devoted so much of our time and attention to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. If the essential first step for banning nuclear tests for all time is not taken, all our efforts to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament will not only be futile but will even appear ridiculous. We are happy to note from the recent debates in the General Assembly that an overwhelming majority of nations endorses this view.

The two resolutions of the General Assembly before us are both important and urgent. It is, however, evident that the degree of urgency attached to resolution 1767 (XVII), relating to general and complete disarmament, is not as great as that attached to resolution 1762 A and B (XVII), dealing with the cessation of nuclear tests. The latter resolution, which expresses the wishes of millions of people, calls for the cessation of all nuclear tests immediately and in any case not later than 1 January 1963; recommends that, if by 1 January 1963 an agreement on the cessation of all tests is not reached, the parties concerned should enter into

"an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests ..." (ENDC/63 - A/RES/1762 (XVII), p.3);

(U Tun Shein, Burma)

and, further, requests this Conference to report to the Assembly by 10 December 1962. Thus, we are pressed for time. In the circumstances my delegation would like to join those other delegations that have requested that the Committee should at this stage concentrate on the question of the cessation of nuclear testing with a view to arriving at an agreement.

During the course of the last few meetings valuable thoughts and suggestions have been offered to enable the nuclear Powers to overcome the present impasse. The Swedish delegation, in a carefully considered statement last Wednesday (ENDC/PV.84, pp. 17 et seq.), suggested the immediate setting up of an interim commission composed of a panel of scientists with functions in line with those set out in the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28).

The Burmese delegation, even before the positions of the two sides had arrived at the present stage, had taken the stand that the setting up of an impartial international scientific body was indispensable to a successful test ban treaty. The Committee will remember that Mr. Barrington stated quite categorically on 2 April:

"... the existence of such an international scientific body would seem to be inseparable from a successful test ban treaty." (ENDC/PV.13, p.7)

We, therefore, had no hesitation in supporting the suggestion made by the Swedish delegation on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77, p.34) to the effect that the international scientific commission proposed in the eight-nation memorandum should be set up at least on an interim basis. The present idea of the Swedish delegation is an extension of the previous one, in concrete form, and my delegation whole-heartedly supports it. It has the means of meeting the wishes of the General Assembly and we would requests the nuclear Powers to give it their most careful and, we hope favourable consideration.

To judge from Mr. Kuznetsov's statement of 17 August (ENDC/PV.71, pp. 37-50), which has been quoted so often, the Soviet Union does not appear to reject in principle on-site inspections by the international scientific commission. Such being the case, the suggestion of the Mexican delegation (ENDC/PV.85, pp. 36 and 37) that invitation should be extended, if the international scientific commission believes that in the case of a doubtful event on-site inspection is necessary, is one which together with the idea of an agreed annual quota of invitations suggested by the Indian delegation (ibid. p.24), merits, in the opinion of my delegation, earnest consideration by the nuclear Powers.

(U Tun Shein, Burma)

Several months have passed since the eight-nation memorandum was presented. The passage of time has convinced us all the more that that memorandum does serve as the basis for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. We feel that the nuclear Powers have not given the memorandum the kind of earnest attention it rightly deserves. We appeal to them to look at it again. Merely to stand on principles, without taking practical requirements into consideration, will get us nowhere. The international atmosphere is comparatively favourable and attempts should again be made with renewed vigour, in a spirit of "mutual understanding and concession", to reach agreement. We believe that if there is good will on both sides agreement is within easy reach.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): In my capacity as the representative of the United States I should now like to make a statement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests.

At our meeting on 28 November (ENDC/PV.84, p.5) the representative of the United Arab Republic, in his capacity as Chairman of that meeting, suggested that it might be profitable if the members of the nuclear test ban Sub-Committee could provide the plenary Committee with a report on the meetings held by the Sub-Committee during our recess. Again, at our meeting on 30 November (ENDC/PV.85, p.45), Mr. El-Zayyat of the United Arab Republic asked if it would be possible to have a short report on the meetings of the nuclear Sub-Committee.

My delegation was an active participant in those meetings, and in an attempt, in part, to meet the request of the Chairman of the eighty-fourth plenary meeting, and also to bring members of the Conference up to date on the recess proceedings of the Sub-Committee as we see them, my delegation would like to devote part of its statement today to a report of the Sub-Committee's activities.

It might be useful, to begin with, to recall for a moment the situation of the Conference with regard to the nuclear test ban question at the beginning of the recess.

The United States and the United Kingdom at that point had just completed tabling their two treaties of 27 August last -- document ENDC/58, a draft comprehensive test ban treaty, and document ENDC/59, a draft partial test ban treaty. The comprehensive draft treaty would end all nuclear tests in all environments for ever. The partial treaty would end tests immediately in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water without the need for additional controls.

These two documents were tabled as a result of careful study and review of our two Governments and as a result of an evaluation of the findings of Project Vela, on which my Government has spent upwards of \$100 million in an effort to improve the

(The Chairman, United States)

ability to detect, to locate and to identify nuclear events. The results of Project Vela were first published by the United States Department of Defense on 7 July 1962, and they are before the Conference as document ENDC/45. The comprehensive draft treaty also included many of the suggestions made by the eight members of the Committee in their joint memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28). All phases of the United States-United Kingdom comprehensive treaty draft were drawn up with the suggestions of the eight nations in mind. The treaty itself, as will be observed from study of it, reflects the primacy of the three important elements of the eight-nation memorandum -- an international scientific commission, a detection system of observation posts throughout the world, and a number of necessary obligatory on-site inspections by the Commission of otherwise unidentified events. Our two Governments still favour the comprehensive test ban treaty; that is the treaty we would prefer to work out and to sign.

The partial test ban treaty was evolved by our two Government as a result of statements made in this Committee by a number of delegations, including those of the eight nations, asking for a partial ban. This partial draft treaty provides for the cessation of all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under the oceans without the need for additional controls. The United States and the United Kingdom were ready on 27 August -- as indeed we were when we submitted our earlier treaty (ENDC/9) in April 1961, and as we are ready now -- to cease all tests in these three environments for ever. Admittedly, this partial treaty is not a complete solution of the problem of ending all nuclear tests, but at the same time it would secure the end of all tests which cause radioactive fallout, and would go far towards halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons to States which have not developed them so far. Indeed, it would be a good beginning toward a cessation of all tests.

The principal features of the three proposals made by my Government on 14 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.69, pp. 9 et seq.) were incorporated in the comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58). These proposals were:

1. A willingness on the part of our two Governments to consider a reduction in the number of on-site inspections by the commission from the previous yearly quota of twelve to twenty such inspections proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom;
2. A willingness to consider a network of manned detection stations equipped with various types of modern instrumentation which:



(The Chairman, United States)

- (a) would involve a number of stations world-wide substantially smaller than the number previously proposed, including a smaller number on the territory of the Soviet Union, and
- (b) would involve nationally-manned and operated, internationally co-ordinated and supervised observation posts instead of a network of internationally-manned and operated stations;

3. Acceptance of the obligatory nature of on-site inspections of otherwise unidentified events by the commission.

These basic proposals were incorporated into a draft treaty whose salient characteristic was an overall simplification of previous United States and United Kingdom draft treaties, including the draft treaty of 18 April 1961. Under the new comprehensive draft treaty proposal (ENDC/58), parties would undertake two primary obligations. First, they would agree to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear tests at any place under their jurisdiction or control. Secondly, they would agree to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of such tests anywhere at any time. Parties would also undertake to co-operate with a commission in the carrying out of all measures of control and in establishing elements of the system. These obligations are made clear in articles I and II of document ENDC/58.

A. international scientific commission, whose members, however, would not necessarily have to be scientists and whose functions are set forth in article III of document ENDC/58, would have general responsibility for the collection of data and for the reporting of all events which could be suspected of being nuclear weapon test explosions. In addition, it would be responsible for making positive identification of the nature of the origin of unidentified seismic events as necessary.

Under article IV of the treaty the international scientific commission would consist of fifteen members -- four from the Soviet bloc, four from the West, and seven from among parties nominated jointly by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. These last three States would be permanent members of the commission. All States serving on the commission would be free to appoint their own representatives to the Commission who, in keeping with its scientific character, could of course be highly qualified scientific experts. The commission itself would be assisted by a small, highly qualified scientific staff.

(The Chairman, United States)

The second element of control -- the system of observation posts or detection stations -- is set forth in article VII of document ENDC/58 and would be based upon existing national stations together with the addition of a number of high quality, newly constructed national stations. The quality of the instrumentation of these stations and their location are necessarily related to their number. They would be operated, as desired by the host government, by local nationals under international supervision. Internationally-manned and operated stations might be set up, if the commission deemed such stations desirable in agreement with the individual government concerned. Such stations might be useful if a particular State felt its own personnel to be inadequate to handle the scientific problems involved or if for any other reason the particular State desired international support for the stations on its territory. The new national stations would be established at sites agreed upon by the parties to the treaty and the commission. The commission itself would establish the specifications for and would pay for maintaining, building, equipping and training personnel for these new nationally-manned stations. In addition, use would be made, as necessary, of national stations already in existence. During the earliest period in the life of the treaty control system, but for a very brief and limited time only, complete reliance would be placed on existing systems until the necessary new stations were built. It is emphasized that this period would be short.

Obligatory on-site inspections by the commission -- the third basic element of the control system -- would be as provided for in article VIII of document ENDC/58. Inspections by the commission would be carried out on the basis of carefully laid down procedures as set forth in the treaty. Events which had been located geographically and which remained unidentified in accordance with the scientific criteria written into the treaty would be eligible for inspection by the commission.

From a purely scientific standpoint, there should be no limitation on the number of inspections. However, in order to reach agreement it is suggested that there should be a quota. Therefore, inspection would take place under a quota arrangement which would permit an agreed maximum number of such inspections each year. Of course, there might well be fewer unidentified events inspected than provided for under the quota, since the quota would represent only a maximum limit on the number of inspections. The area which could be inspected around the epicentre of the seismic event would also be limited, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, to a few hundred square kilometres.

(The Chairman, United States)

The staffing of the on-site inspection teams of the commission in an objective, impartial and scientific manner is also set forth in great detail in the draft treaty. Together with other provisions of the treaty, the staffing provisions would constitute a real safeguard against any possible charges of espionage and, as we have said many times, we are open-minded about these staffing provisions in so far as they would not interfere with the true scientific character of the commission and its on-site operations.

For maximum deterrence in advance to any State which might be led to violate the treaty, events to be inspected within the quota in the United States and the United Kingdom would be selected by the Soviet Union, while for events in the Soviet Union the opposite would be true. Although this means that not every unidentified event would be inspected by the commission, it is correct that any unidentified event would be eligible for inspection. Putting the choice of events to be inspected in the hands of the other side ensures that the party most hurt by violations, and therefore most interested in deterring violations of the treaty, has the opportunity to exercise its judgement in the case. If it were to be done on a truly scientific basis there ought to be no quota. These features of our system, we believe, ensure that there would be maximum deterrence in advance to violations.

The treaty also contains provisions -- in Article XIII of ENDC/58 -- for withdrawal from the treaty, in specific circumstances, if treaty obligations are not being fulfilled.

The United Kingdom and the United States have tried to draft this treaty as fairly, objectively and scientifically as possible. Subsequent to the presentation of the comprehensive draft treaty the Soviet Union accepted, apparently, a Mexican suggestion that there should be a cut-off date for nuclear testing: 1 January 1963 (ENDC/SC.1/PV.24, pp. 24-25). The United States provided arrangements for the inclusion of such a cut-off date in both of its draft treaties and President Kennedy indicated that the United States would be prepared to cease testing, under effective treaty controls, on 1 January 1963. In these circumstances it was proposed by the two Western delegations that meetings of the test ban Sub-Committee should be continued during the last recess of the Conference and while the subjects of nuclear testing and disarmament were being discussed at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The Soviet Union agreed.

During the recess there were nineteen meetings of the test ban Sub-Committee in all. The United States and the United Kingdom hoped to receive constructive comments from the Soviet Union on the draft proposals for a treaty which they had submitted.

(The Chairman, United States)

Our two delegations hoped to enter into fruitful and constructive negotiations with the Soviet Union on many of the various aspects of the new treaty drafts. There were many areas where the two sides appeared to be close together, and it was those areas which the United States and the United Kingdom hoped would be broadened by the recess negotiations of the test ban Sub-Committee.

During the recess the United States and the United Kingdom attempted to work out with the Soviet Union arrangements concerning the operation and composition of the international commission, but were told by the Soviet Union that such detailed negotiations about the commission would have to wait until all outstanding issues had first been agreed upon in principle. When it was proposed to the Soviet Union by the Western delegations to work out questions related to the world-wide control post system the Soviet Union insisted that that would not be necessary, since all the control posts which would be required already existed and there would be no need for co-ordination and co-operation among the existing stations. However, the Soviet Union did not adduce any scientific information or any scientific data to support its statements in this regard. I think we all know that the basic control system for any effective treaty must have a co-ordinated network of posts, with up-to-date instrumentation and with the means for the rapid communication of data as received from that co-ordinated network of posts. Without that the treaty simply would not work.

On the question of on-site inspection the United States attempted to find out from the Soviet delegation on what scientific bases the Soviet Union believed that existing systems of detection stations were adequate to detect and identify all seismic events. However, the Soviet Union refused to provide that information -- and still does refuse. Instead it has insisted on quoting extensively from Western newspaper clippings, proffering those quotations as the scientific proof of the correctness of its position. For example, it offered newspaper clippings with respect to a new digital seismometer which had been developed at the California Institute of Technology, which while a useful tool does not permit the identification of nuclear events by distant instrumentation. In addition, when the Soviet Union was asked how it believed on-site inspection would affect the national security interests of the Soviet Union its delegation consistently failed to respond.

For its part, the Soviet delegation proposed to the West that agreement could be reached on three so-called bases. First, it said that the Western delegations could accept the Soviet position of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11). Secondly, it said

(The Chairman, United States)

that the United States and the United Kingdom could reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the basis of the Soviet Union's unilateral interpretation of the eight-nation memorandum. In this connexion, at the meeting of the Sub-Committee on 14 September (ENDC/SC.1/PV.26, p.21), Mr. Tsarapkin said, in effect, that the eight-nation memorandum was merely a further embodiment of the principles incorporated by the Soviet Union in its proposal of 28 November 1961. Under Mr. Tsarapkin's own interpretation there was no major substantive difference between the eight-nation memorandum and the position of the Soviet Union of 28 November. Finally, the West was given the choice of agreeing to its own partial test ban treaty provided it was accompanied by an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium on underground tests to last for an unspecified period of time. That final offer was, of course, the scientifically unsupported Soviet position of 28 November 1961 in its third and final guise. At the same time the United States and the United Kingdom offered, time and time again, to negotiate on the terms of their carefully thought out and scientifically supported detailed treaties, and made it clear that they wished to discuss any of the basic difficulties and were prepared to bring their scientists to Geneva for the purpose. The Soviet Union declined to bring its scientists to Geneva and declined to discuss any of the detailed scientific questions.

It is clear to all why the Sub-Committee cannot report greater progress towards a test ban treaty. The great and basic differences between the two sides which stand in the way of stopping all tests are concerned with the problem of control over underground tests. On that question the United States and the United Kingdom have made it abundantly clear that they are willing immediately to set aside the most troublesome issues for later settlement and to record and implement agreement now on the banning of those tests the control over which is not a matter of dispute between the two sides. In addition the two Governments have made it clear that they are willing to settle the question of underground tests on the basis of truly objective scientific evidence. They still take that position. They have advanced their scientific evidence, but the Soviet Union has not advanced, and refuses to advance, any scientific evidence on this point; and it has refused, and continued to refuse, to produce scientists to discuss this question.

The United Kingdom and the United States have always taken the position, and still do, that if it can be shown by objective scientific evidence that the scientists from their two countries are operating on incomplete or incorrect data they are more

(The Chairman, United States)

than willing to listen. The Soviet Union has continued to insist on a scientific position with regard to the identification of seismic events which is unsupported by the scientific evidence at hand and, at the same time, has refused to present any scientific evidence on its own side of the case.

The United States has appropriated and is continuing to appropriate money in order to increase the ability to detect seismic events and to make available results of this scientific research for the benefit of the entire world.

In spite of the less than auspicious note which the recess negotiations bring to our resumed negotiations, I can assure members that the delegation of the United States will do all it possibly can to find a workable and effective solution to this question.

Before closing, I should like to turn to another facet of our discussion of a test ban. In our recent plenary meetings a number of useful statements, suggestions, proposals and observations have been made by various delegations. Our position with respect of these proposals should be clear to all. First and foremost let me say that my Government distinctly welcomes those proposals urging an immediate signature of a partial test ban treaty in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space.

Second, I repeat what I said in my intervention on 28 November (ENDC/PV.84, p.32) namely, that we will give all of those proposals, including the Swedish proposals, the most careful consideration. My Government is now engaged in studying them. We will, of course, pay careful attention to the provisions with respect to the necessary safeguards on underground tests, including obligatory on-site inspection. We believe that any agreement must contain measures for detection and inspection concomitant with the obligation to cease testing. An interim agreement in this respect should, to characterize General Assembly Resolution 1762A(XVII), be no less effective than a permanent ban. My Government will be prepared at a future time to indicate the results of its study of these proposals.

Third, our position on an uncontrolled, uninspected moratorium is crystal clear. We oppose such an arrangement and we will not enter into such an uncontrolled, uninspected moratorium arrangement again. We have had a sad and a bitter experience with an uninspected obligation or pledge to cease tests. Now, quite frankly, the shoe is on the other foot. Now is the time for the other side to come forward and to try an adequate and effectively controlled agreement banning all tests, just as we tried the uninspected, uncontrolled arrangement. I can assure my Soviet colleagues, it will be a much more pleasant experience than that to which the Soviet Government subjected my Government in September, 1961.

(The Chairman, United States)

Fourth, we believe the Swedish suggestion offers some interesting comments with respect to an international commission.

There is, indeed, as the Swedish representative pointed out, a large measure of agreement on an international commission. I refer members of delegations to the details on an international commission as set forth in our comprehensive draft treaty (ENDC/58).

A careful look at the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty will show that certain detailed proposals in this respect have been made. If members will look at article IV of document ENDC/58, they will see that considerable detail has been included concerning the membership of an international commission, the means of appointment of its members and its mode of operation.

For example, the suggestion of the eight-nation Memorandum (ENDC/28) for the inclusion of a large number of representatives from the States not committed to either side has been incorporated in this draft treaty. Both sides have also indicated that they accept the suggestions of the eight nations, and on this particular suggestion there has been little or no indication of divergency in the interpretation of the memorandum.

As will be noted, article IV of document ENDC/58 also calls for a commission divided along lines which reflect specific Soviet suggestions about the organization of a nuclear test ban commission. In particular, both the United States and the United Kingdom and their allies are to be represented in equal numbers with the Soviet bloc. As I noted earlier, each of the sides is to have four member countries on the commission.

In addition, there will be seven members chosen from among the States jointly nominated by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This means of nomination will, of course, ensure that States not aligned with either NATO or the Warsaw Pact will fill these places. This will ensure that degree of impartiality which we all believe, I hope, ought to be characteristic of a commission. The commission we have proposed in article IV of document ENDC/58 would ensure as well the parity with the West which the Soviet Union has always maintained would be necessary if the make-up of such a commission was to be acceptable to the Soviet Union.

It is important to remember that a commission administering a nuclear test ban treaty will have to deal with extensive administrative and financial problems. Indeed, any operating system will require expenditures which can probably only be met by

(The Chairman, United States)

Government contributions. We shall need to ensure, for this reason alone, that governments therefore have the primary role in the operation of the commission. I believe this is the only way that such a nuclear test ban commission can be made to operate effectively. This also represents a significant area of East-West agreement on this question.

There should be no question, then, that the major problems of the formation of the commission are apparently part of the wide area of agreement which now exists.

In addition to the question of the international commission, many delegations have touched on the problem of on-site inspections. I noted many statements at the eighty-fifth plenary meeting were devoted to this most difficult question.

I also detected, in my review of the verbatim records, a single thread running through all of those statements which appears to be extremely significant, particularly in view of the fact that many of the delegations which made the statements were among the sponsors of the eight-nation memorandum.

For example, the representative of Sweden took the trouble to quote from the speech of his Foreign Minister in the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations. With his permission I should like to repeat in particular the portion of Mr. Torsten Nilsson's statement which reads as follows:

"It would also be possible to provide guarantees against the misuse of the obligation" -- I repeat obligation -- "to subject oneself to a certain degree of inspection ..." (ENDC/PV.84, p.21)

Further, in speaking of this subject, the representative of India had a number of interesting things to say. This one quotation, however, appears to me to make an important point:

"We have been thinking over the various approaches made by different delegations to this issue" -- the issue of on-site inspection -- "and we wonder whether it might not actually be found that there is a meeting point in these various approaches: assuming, of course, that all the positions stated are directed to the same purpose, namely, to securing adequate assurance for both the detection and identification of events by the international commission which has been agreed upon. I believe that, again, is common ground -- that there should be processes by which such identification could be made. In any case I should like to point out that this is an essential basis which has been stated in paragraph 6 of the first part of resolution 1762 (XVII) of the General Assembly". (ENDC/PV.85, pp. 23-24)



(The Chairman, United States)

The paragraph in resolution 1762A(XVII) recommends that an interim agreement should include "adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events."

Another interesting and significant statement was made on 30 November which also touched on this question of inspection. The representative of Mexico said a number of very important things at that meeting, but I should like particularly to quote the following:

"On-site inspection is not an end in itself but a means of dispelling doubts and suspicions whenever a seismic event is recorded which cannot be identified at a distance ... It can, however, dispel any suspicion that an unidentified seismic event may be the result of a secret underground explosion, a breach of undertakings committed behind the back of one of the parties. Compulsory inspection operates as a radar device, and at the same time constitutes a deterrent against possible fraudulent violations."

(ibid. p.35)

It seems to me that the common thread which runs through those statements, and which was also prevalent in the statements of other delegations in the most recent meetings of our Conference, is the fact that a certain number of on-site inspections is indeed necessary to assure identification and to deter clandestine treaty violations. If this position were to be accepted by all of the parties to our negotiations, it seems to me we could quickly reach a solution to this problem and record agreement on what would be a momentous first step in our quest for general and complete disarmament.

Mr. GSAARFINK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, speaking today as the representative of the United States, you expounded before the Committee your own version of the course of the negotiations in the three-Power Sub-Committee and stated your own assessment of the positions of the two sides. As in your earlier statements, the account given by you today is full of inaccuracies and, I would even say, distortions of the real situation. Certainly, we shall study the statement you have made today and we shall give our reply later. Today I should like to dwell not on the old positions of the sides but on the new factors which have emerged at this stage of the negotiations on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests and I should like to put forward some considerations with a view to moving our negotiations forward.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Today, after our recess, the Committee is taking up the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The Committee is faced with the task of achieving a solution of this problem as required by the interests of the maintenance of peace and by the will of the peoples which was given expression in the debate at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We fully share the opinion of those members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee who, in the course of the general debate, pointed out the urgent need to solve the question of prohibiting nuclear weapon tests. The cessation of nuclear tests is important not only in itself as a step towards slackening the nuclear arms race and as a measure which would, to some extent, slow down the further development of weapons of mass destruction. The importance of an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests lies also in the fact that such an agreement would facilitate the solution of our main problem - general and complete disarmament. The achievement of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests would be an excellent preparatory step towards the implementation of the most important measures for the prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons in the course of general and complete disarmament. The realization that this is so should be a stimulus to the members of the Committee to redouble their efforts in order to remove the difficulties standing in the way of an agreement.

One cannot but agree with the remarks made by many members of the Committee who have already spoken in the discussions to the effect that at the present time we have more favourable conditions for reaching an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The negotiations which took place earlier in the Eighteen-Nation Committee were not fruitless. Today, as everyone can see, the difference between the positions of the main parties concerned have been narrowed down considerably, and it was precisely on the basis of this fact that the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, pointed out in his message to President Kennedy of 27 October that the positions of the sides on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests were not so far apart. Consequently, no great efforts are needed in order to overcome the comparatively small distance separating the positions of the nuclear Powers and to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. We are convinced that such an agreement is within our reach, provided that all the parties show good will.

There are a number of positive factors which may contribute to the success of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in solving the question of the cessation of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

nuclear weapon tests. The period of the recess was not altogether wasted. The extensive debate which took place in the General Assembly on the suspension of nuclear tests was very useful. It is not only we who think so but all the members of the United Nations, all those who took part in the debate. As a result of the discussions at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly on the problem of the suspension of nuclear tests, it became clear along what lines a solution to the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests should be sought.

In the first place, the discussions in the General Assembly showed convincingly that all nuclear weapon tests must be prohibited without exception. There must be no exemptions. A so-called partial agreement -- that is, an agreement which would in fact legalize the continuation of nuclear weapon tests underground -- would be no solution and would merely create dangerous illusions. In their statements in the First Committee of the General Assembly many representatives entered into a thorough analysis which showed clearly that a so-called partial agreement, far from being useful, could, on the contrary, have harmful consequences. This was pointed out in particular by members of our Committee -- the representatives of Burma, Ethiopia, and others. It is appropriate to remind the members of the Committee of the arguments and considerations which show the complete unsoundness of a partial agreement.

To leave States free to carry out nuclear weapon tests underground -- and this would be precisely the consequence of a partial agreement -- would have the result that the nuclear armaments race would continue as before and the improvement and testing of nuclear weapons would go on in the same way as before the conclusion of an agreement. By means of experimental explosions in shafts and tunnels, existing types of nuclear weapons would be improved and new, even more terrible, types of such weapons would be developed. In the course of the discussions in the General Assembly, many representatives quoted a statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ENDC/PV.71, p.20) in which he showed very clearly and eloquently what extensive possibilities for creating new types of nuclear weapons were offered by underground nuclear tests. One of the main aims, and I should say the decisive aim, which we set before us in striving for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests is to erect a first barrier in front of the nuclear armaments race, to take the first step towards removing the threat of nuclear war. Shall we achieve this aim with the partial agreement which the United States proposes to us? It is clear that we shall not achieve it. On the contrary, an even more dangerous situation might come about, since the competition in creating nuclear weapons, transferred underground, would continue under cover of an agreement --

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

I stress: would continue under cover of an agreement -- while harmful and dangerous illusions would be created in the minds of the peoples, who would think that some movement was being made in the direction of reducing the threat of nuclear war, whereas, in fact, the threat would become even greater and more widespread.

A partial treaty cannot be the product of an agreement on mutually acceptable terms taking into account the interests of both sides. A partial treaty would result in definite military advantages to the side which has made underground nuclear explosions one of its main methods of testing nuclear weapons and has accumulated enormous experience in this respect.

A correct understanding of this aspect of the question was shown by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, who, on 15 October 1962, speaking at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly, stated -- and I take the liberty of quoting this passage from Mr. Padilla Nervo's statement:

"Every series of nuclear tests that any Power carries out provokes the nation that carried out the previous series the scientific and political need to analyse those tests, and in turn forces that Power to reply with new tests, alleging that reasons of national security, military balance, reprisals, or the right to the last word make it necessary for it to do the same thing.

And thus one series of tests will follow the other." (A/PV.1153 (provisional) p.92).

Indeed, how could one of the nuclear Powers accept an agreement which would afford to the other nuclear Power the possibility of continuing nuclear weapon tests underground and of gaining thereby an advantage in the development and creation of new types of nuclear weapons? It is obvious that the nuclear Power thus affected will not accept such an agreement. There is another aspect of this question. If nuclear weapon tests continue underground, other States may be faced with the need, in order to ensure their own security, to start testing their own nuclear weapons and they will consider themselves entitled to carry out such tests in the environment which they deem appropriate. Those who emphasized in the General Assembly that the life span of a partial agreement, even if such an agreement were to be concluded, would be very short indeed, were right.

All this shows unquestionably that the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests must be comprehensive and universal and from the outset. The danger of the nuclear arms race is not only that new types of nuclear warheads and bombs are being created, but also that other States may be drawn into this race, as has been repeatedly pointed out

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

in our discussions. This, of course, will make it even more difficult to solve both the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the problem of general and complete disarmament.

Thus, from all points of view, only an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests without exception -- in the atmosphere, under water, in outer space and underground -- can have real significance and real force. This simple truth has been realized by the majority of Members of the United Nations and they clearly expressed themselves, both in the debate and in the resolution which was adopted, in favour of prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests. The objections of the overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations to the attempts to push through, even in a veiled form, the possibility of continuing nuclear weapon tests underground were so determined that the United States and the United Kingdom were compelled to delete paragraph 2 of their draft resolution which provided for the cessation of tests in three environments only -- in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. So far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we have always maintained, and we shall continue to maintain, that an agreement must cover all nuclear tests. And we shall strive unswervingly for such an agreement.

Another important conclusion reached by the Members of the United Nations in the course of the discussions on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is that it is difficult, if not altogether impossible, to achieve an agreement in the circumstances where the spiral of the race in conducting experimental nuclear explosions is rising ever more steeply. It was for this reason that Mexico's proposal to put an end to nuclear tests and to call on States to cease all nuclear weapon tests not later than 1 January 1963 met with such wide support. This will of the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations was expressed in General Assembly resolution 1762A (XVII). Paragraph 2 of this resolution unconditionally asks that after 1 January 1963 no one should carry out any nuclear weapon tests in any environment, whether or not an agreement has been concluded by that date. The Soviet Union fully supported this proposal. We voted for this paragraph because we considered that it would create a peaceful atmosphere and favourable conditions for reaching agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear tests for all time.

As a result of the work of the General Assembly we have also been given a more solid basis for working out an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) has received massive support, as several speakers

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

in our Committee have pointed out. This means that the General Assembly has firmly expressed itself in favour of control by national means of detecting nuclear explosions and it also means that the General Assembly has firmly expressed itself against any attempt to impose the principle of compulsory inspection.

Apart from these positive aspects of the work of the General Assembly, which, in our opinion, considerably increase the possibility of making the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee successful, I should like to note other circumstances which facilitate our task. In the course of the work of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union, going forward to meet the Western Powers and in full accord with the prevailing desire of the Assembly to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests without exception, announced from the rostrum of the General Assembly its readiness to sign immediately an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, at the same time including in such an agreement an undertaking to continue negotiations on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests and an undertaking not to conduct such tests while negotiations are proceeding and until agreement is reached on the prohibition of underground nuclear explosions. In acting in that way we demonstrated our readiness to take into account, within reasonable limits, the viewpoint of the Western Powers and to make it easier for them to move away from their old, unrealistic positions and to find by joint efforts a mutually acceptable solution of the problem. We were gratified by the fact that our proposal met with understanding among the Members of the United Nations and was assessed by them in a positive way.

To complete the picture of the new possibilities which have opened up before the Eighteen-Nation Committee since the resumption of its work, we should also like to recall that Soviet Union, United States and United Kingdom scientists three months ago put forward the idea of using for the purpose of control over underground nuclear explosions automatic seismic stations which do not require the presence of foreign inspectors. There is no doubt that this proposal makes it possible to eliminate the differences on the question of the organization of control over the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The use of automatic seismic stations or, as some people prefer to call them, "black boxes", would still further extend the possibilities of observing and controlling nuclear tests. As is well known, the Soviet Union adopted a positive attitude to this idea, and we are prepared to accept these views of the scientists in regard to the use of automatic seismic stations for control purposes.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

So, if we are to assess the present situation objectively, we can say with complete justification that we are starting negotiations in circumstances in which we have additional possibilities and favourable prospects have opened up before us. The task consists in taking the fullest possible advantage of these favourable circumstances and in reaching agreement without delay on a final ban on all nuclear weapon tests.

We are compelled to note, however, that the course of the discussions here on this question cannot but cause concern to those who sincerely wish to put an end to nuclear weapon tests immediately and for ever. In their resolution the States Members of the United Nations called on us to work in the spirit of constructive compromise. Nevertheless, in the statements of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom it is impossible to find even a trace or a grain of this spirit of constructive compromise. They demand rights of inspection, that is, they continue to stick to their old positions which in the past blocked any possibility of agreement.

If the Western Powers persist in their demands, then, of course, no agreement will be possible and the Committee will not fulfil the task assigned to it by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

However, that is not the only thing that causes us concern. In the light of the new and favourable prospects which we have mentioned, we cannot help being amazed at the trend that one is trying to give to the discussions in the Committee. Some representatives, in particular the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, have expressed the view that we should concentrate our efforts on a so-called interim agreement. It is altogether difficult to understand why the Committee should switch its attention to the elaboration of an interim agreement. Why is such an attitude making its appearance at a time when the work of the Committee has only just restarted after the recess? We have not heard any convincing arguments in support of the view that we should now abandon the conclusion of a permanent comprehensive agreement and restrict ourselves to the conclusion of an interim agreement.

Reference has been made in the Committee to paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A(XVII). But we should bear in mind that, whereas resolution 1762A was adopted, as several representatives have reminded us, without any objection, it is quite impossible to say the same about paragraph 6. A number of States, including the Soviet Union, voted against this paragraph because it conceals, in a disguised form, an attempt to

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

reduce the whole matter to a partial agreement, leaving the Powers free to carry out underground nuclear weapon tests. However, the disguise of this paragraph is very transparent and we could remind the Committee of how it came into being. At first this paragraph, which was proposed by the Canadian delegation, spoke frankly and plainly of the cessation of tests in only three environments. It is well known, however, that this undisguised attempt to push through the point of view of the States interested in continuing underground nuclear weapon tests met with determined opposition in the General Assembly, as a result of which those who advocated this paragraph were compelled to disguise, to some extent, the real object of paragraph 6. However, the attitude of the Soviet Union to this paragraph is clear. We have explained it in our statements and we have confirmed it by our vote, that is to say, we voted against this paragraph.

In any case, resolution 1762A (XVII) urges the Eighteen-Nation Committee to arrive at a final solution of the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. But even from the point of view of the authors of paragraph 6, the question of an interim agreement could only arise after it would have finally become apparent that no definitive agreement could be reached.

The turn which some members of the Committee are giving to our discussions by trying to replace a final solution of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests by some interim arrangement can only play into the hands of those who wish to avoid altogether a solution of the question of banning nuclear tests and to bring to nought the new possibilities which have opened up before us. This is precisely the position in regard to an interim agreement which was advocated by the Western Powers for nearly a year at the very beginning of our negotiations in the autumn of 1950. Later, under the pressure of world opinion they were compelled to abandon this position. We note with surprise that this fallacious idea has now turned up again.

The Soviet delegation is giving careful consideration to the views expressed by various representatives in our Committee. But even at the present moment we deem it appropriate to draw attention to the contradictions into which the advocates of an interim agreement or an interim arrangement fall. The representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, asserted that the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries could be taken as a basis for an interim agreement (ENDC/PV.35, pp. 15-16). We simply cannot understand how it is possible to make such a statement. The memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries was put forward as a compromise platform on the



(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

basis of which it might be possible to eliminate the differences between the nuclear Powers. If one reads the actual text of the memorandum carefully, one can easily see that the authors, the eight non-aligned countries, put forward this document as a basis for the final prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests and not for a temporary respite after which experimental nuclear explosions could start again with renewed energy. The introductory part of the memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries calls on the nuclear Powers "to persist in their efforts to come as soon as possible to an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests for all time". (ENDC/28, p.1).

The advocates of an interim agreement try to justify it by alleging that it is necessary in order to solve the question of inspection. The differences on the question of inspection are indeed the most serious ones preventing us from arriving at an agreement. The road to an agreement is blocked by the demand of the Western Powers for compulsory inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union. This demand affects the security interests of the Soviet State. On the other hand, the demand for inspection is outdated and has become superfluous in the light of recent scientific and technical achievements. Moreover, if the Western Powers were to agree to put into practice the idea put forward by the Pugwash Conference of scientists regarding the use of automatic seismic stations for control purposes (ENDC/66), then the last remaining doubts of the Western Powers would certainly be removed. We are faced with rather a paradoxical situation. Some representatives here say that we cannot arrive at a final solution of the problem since there is no agreement on the question of inspection. At the same time, they propose that we come to an interim agreement, but again with the very same inspection on account of which we are unable to reach agreement. Is it not clear that a vicious circle is being artificially created, the result of which can only be that no agreement at all will be reached on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests?

The logic of things points to the fact that an interim agreement, with inspection to boot, as described by Mr. Burns and some other representatives, would be a welcome valuable gift to those circles which have not renounced nuclear war as a means of carrying out their political plans and are therefore opposed to an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. For these circles, the demand for inspection is a sure way of preventing an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is difficult to imagine a more peculiar combination than a proposal for an interim agreement together with inspection. On the one hand, it is proposed that we substitute for a comprehensive agreement an interim agreement which is obviously unacceptable, since the States concluding an interim agreement would have no guarantee, I stress this point, no guarantee that an interim agreement would be replaced by a final agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests. On the other hand, there is the desire to impose compulsory inspection on us, when it is known beforehand that this is unacceptable to the Soviet Union. After all, inspection, irrespective of whether it is to be carried out under a final agreement or under an interim agreement, still retains characteristics which are objectionable to the other side, since it opens up wide opportunities for collecting information on the defence system of the country which is being inspected. At the same time, the other side would be able at any moment to terminate an interim agreement and to start underground tests of new types of nuclear weapons.

That the matter boils down precisely to this can be inferred from another remark made by Mr. Burns, when he estimated the probable time-limit of an interim arrangement, namely, a year or six months (ENDC/PV.85, p.17). We are well enough informed to know that this is precisely the length of time required to prepare a new series of nuclear tests.

Thus an interim agreement could be merely an interval between two scheduled series of nuclear tests. It turns out therefore that an interim agreement of the kind mentioned by Mr. Burns would boil down to control and inspection without a real prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Both the one and the other are in the interests of the Western Powers and neither the one nor the other can serve as a basis for an agreement.

An objective analysis shows that the considerations concerning so-called interim agreements of the kind mentioned by the representatives of Canada, Mexico and India -- and to some extent this was also referred to by the representative of Sweden -- do not lighten our task. On the contrary, they create new difficulties. They do not help our cause; they complicate it.

Certainly, the need arises for some kind of "modus vivendi" while negotiations are in progress for an agreement. It is precisely in this connexion that we have the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations -- I have already referred to paragraph 2 of resolution (1762A (XVII)), which proposes that all nuclear

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

weapon tests should cease as from 1 January 1963, if by this date no agreement has been concluded. If all the nuclear Powers showed respect for this widely supported resolution of the General Assembly and ceased all nuclear weapon tests "de facto" from 1 January 1963, this would undoubtedly create a favourable climate for the successful conclusion of the negotiations on an agreement to prohibit all nuclear weapon tests for all time.

In conclusion, we consider it necessary to stress once again that we have before us good possibilities of finding a mutually acceptable solution to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. We have already indicated the readiness of the Soviet Union to take advantage of the idea put forward by the Pugwash Conference of scientists regarding the use of automatic seismic stations. The installation of such stations would increase to an even greater extent the capabilities of the existing network of national posts and would make control over the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests even more effective. We call on all the participants in the negotiations -- the members of this Committee -- to follow this path which would lead to an agreement, and not to wander off into sidetracks into which we are bound to be led by proposals such as those put forward in the Committee by the Canadian and some other representatives.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Today's statements have given us new food for thought and my delegation will study them carefully in the verbatim record.

In particular I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Tsarapkin, for the full report which you have given us on the work of the Nuclear Sub-Committee during the recess.

This report shows that the Western nuclear Powers have spared no effort to achieve agreement even if none has actually been reached.

I hope these efforts will in the end meet with a response on the part of the Soviet delegation, despite the negative position which Mr. Tsarapkin has unfortunately re-stated today. I earnestly hope that the discussion on tests which we have begun will show us that this negative attitude by the Soviet delegation is neither understood nor approved by the great majority of the delegations taking part in this Conference.

I asked to speak this morning because, with special reference to the debates which took place last Friday (ENDC/PV.85) and which in my view were very interesting,

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I should like at the present stage of our discussion to restate the Italian delegation's attitude to this fundamental question of a nuclear tests ban.

The Italian delegation considers that tests in the atmosphere and in any other environment where an explosion may produce radioactive fall-out, are a threat to human health and a mortal danger for future generations.

The representative of Sweden has quoted Professor Pauling's estimate that 16 million children will be born deformed because of the explosions carried out in the atmosphere so far (ENDC/PV.84, p.14). I do not know whether such terrifying forecasts are correct; nobody knows. But mystery does not detract from the serious nature of the threat, it only adds the frightening element of uncertainty.

This is why the Italian delegation has asked and is pressing for the immediate cessation -- without control -- of all experiments which result in radioactive fall-out. The United States and the United Kingdom are ready to sign at once an agreement prohibiting all such tests.

To this appeal the USSR has replied with unconvincing arguments which Mr. Tsarapkin has repeated today. These arguments in any case have no validity compared with the reasons which speak for an immediate ban on explosions in the atmosphere. On these pretexts, as Mr. Tsarapkin confirmed this morning, the Soviet Union is subordinating the acceptance of an agreement indispensable to the well-being of humanity to the signature of another agreement which is concerned only with the armaments race.

These are responsibilities which cannot be evaded. We favour the conclusion of this second agreement which also bans underground tests. We earnestly hope for it, and we are ready to support the conclusion of any agreement on this matter which fulfils two basic conditions, firstly, that there should be no moratorium without control even for a limited period, and secondly, that there should be some compulsory inspection even though it may be limited. The reasons for these requirements are well known. If any doubt remained on the subject, recent events have proved the need for vigilance.

In the present circumstances and until there is positive proof that confidence has been re-established, the countries of the West must be on their guard and must watch over the safety of their peoples.

When the delegations of the eight non-aligned countries submitted their memorandum to the Conference (ENDC/28), the Italian delegation at once welcomed it

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

as a valuable effort to promote the solution of our problems, noting, (1) that it did not propose any moratorium without control; and (2) that in the Italian delegation's opinion it provided for an inspection which would be limited, objective and scientific but compulsory.

This last point, which appeared self-evident to the Italian delegation and to other delegations, has up till now been contested by the delegations of the socialist countries which have thus held up any attempt to spell out the legal or scientific clauses of the memorandum. That is why, despite the efforts of the Western and non-aligned delegations, no progress could be made at our earlier sessions to define the practical scope of the memorandum and transform it into a formal undertaking. But after the discussion at the General Assembly, the debate which has taken place here in the light of the Assembly's recommendations is beginning to bring out the real meaning of the memorandum. It is too soon for my delegation to attempt a final assessment of the many observations and proposals which have been made here in the last few days in connexion with the memorandum. We still need to think the matter over, but I have the impression that ideas and trends have emerged which confirm the positive value attached by the Italian delegation to this important document from the very first.

The representative of India stressed last Friday that all the proposals in the memorandum were designed to secure "adequate assurance for both detection and identification of events by the international commission" (ENDC/PV.35, p.23). This corresponds exactly to the conviction of the Italian delegation, which has repeatedly stated that in its opinion the memorandum would provide valid and reliable means of preventing any possibility of clandestine tests.

In addition last Friday we heard some extremely interesting positive proposals. If we examine closely the means of implementing the memorandum which have been indicated, they seem to confirm the opinion that the on-site inspections provided for in it represent an obligation for the contracting parties unless of course other means of identifying doubtful phenomena are available.

I feel that by taking this course we have at last entered the constructive phase of practical and legal elaboration of the memorandum, a process which we have always deemed essential if we are to leave barren polemics behind and get down to action.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The delegations which have helped the conference to take this course have made a useful contribution to our work, and the Italian delegation hopes that they will continue to define and develop their ideas.

The Italian delegation is happy to note that, as the memorandum is gradually clarified by the statements of its co-authors, it is seen to conform more and more closely to the principles which the Italian delegation has always considered necessary for the conclusion of an agreement.

Some delegations have also spoken of an interim application of the memorandum or, if I understand rightly, of its de facto application. I understand and share the feelings which have motivated these discussions, but haste to achieve results must not be allowed to lessen the chances of success.

In my opinion the memorandum should first of all be elaborated and clearly defined with the approval of all concerned. Then only can it be put into application without misgivings. Some of the undertakings regarding which we and other delegations have no doubts are not clear to everyone else, and their application would be likely to give rise to misunderstandings. Personally I think that the implementation of the memorandum can only be satisfactory if we are sure that it will not cause any disputes or controversy. On the other hand I should be in favour of setting up immediately a commission of scientists from the 18 countries represented at the Conference, as proposed by the Swedish delegation (ENDC/PV.84, pp. 17 et seq.), if this commission's first task was to assist us in our work, which, as I have often pointed out, has very complicated scientific aspects. The reference by Mr. Tsarapkin this morning to black boxes seems to show that the Soviet delegation, which had always been opposed to it, would now agree to the Conference's carrying out technical and scientific studies. This would be a notable step forward. Of course, a scientific commission collaborating with the Conference would be of great help to us. No doubt this group of scientists appointed by the 18 countries could later become the nucleus of the future international commission provided for by the memorandum, once that memorandum has come into force. But I do not think that this group of scientists can supervise the execution of an agreement until it has been duly signed and brought into force. We should be confronted with the difficulties I have alluded to above.

These, Mr. Chairman, are quite preliminary observations. I only wanted to give my first impressions after Friday's debate. Moreover the discussion on tests has scarcely begun. As you know, the Italian delegation hopes that that discussion will

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

be a thorough one. It is aware that this wish is shared by the great majority of delegations. New elements of judgement will be submitted to us, but I hope I am not mistaken in saying that if the delegations of the socialist countries are ready to follow us, we have entered the stage of spelling out the memorandum in accordance with the principles indicated at the beginning of my statement, which my delegation considers indispensable.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): In embarking on the new stage of our discussions on a test ban agreement I think we should bear in mind certain undeniable and at the same time undisputed facts. First, that there has been a very important rapprochement of the positions of the nuclear Powers: whatever differences continue to exist concern one environment only. Secondly, that the extreme urgency of the issue has not only become manifestly clear but has also, I suggest, objectively matured for solution. These conclusions have been confirmed in recent statements made by the leaders of the three nuclear Powers, as well as during the debate on the subject in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

One can, therefore, fully subscribe to the words of the representative of Sweden, when, referring at our meeting on 28 November to resolution 1762A (XVII) of the United Nations General Assembly, he said that it contained stronger and more impelling language than any earlier resolution on the subject, and added:

"It has to be regarded as an expression of world-wide opinion which has grown more and more restless and impatient ..." (ENDC/PV.84, p.13)

These facts -- objective facts -- should lead us to the following general conclusions.

First, that the nuclear arms race has reached a critical point which confronts us with a very dangerous situation, which in turn may lead us to unforeseen consequences. Nuclear tests themselves are a most important element in that race: consequently, any partial solution of that problem would not meet the requirements of the situation. Here I can hardly agree with the representative of Italy when he says that the arguments in favour of stopping tests in all environments are not convincing. By saying that they are not convincing he is not convincing anybody. I think we have to press for a solution in the matter of the cessation of tests in all environments. As one speaker in the General Assembly put it so well: what the man in the street wants, whether he be in the streets of Moscow, Washington or London -- or, I would add, of any other place -- is the cessation of testing, without reservation and without delay. The only question which divides us is how to deal with the issue of underground tests.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

Here, again, I cannot agree with the representative of Italy. I would say that we cannot minimize the importance of those tests, both from the military point of view and from the point of view of the other effects they produce. They are today certainly not negligible at all. Some scientists consider them even more important than tests in other environments. They are therefore — and, I submit, must be considered as — part and parcel of the whole transaction.

It has been suggested that some serious concessions have been made concerning control. That may be so but, bearing in mind, I believe we are all bound to agree that those concessions have been preceded by gigantic strides of modern science. The development of science makes it possible today to record explosions from very distant areas -- explosions of very low yield. All this is well known, and I only refer to it in order to say that science is making much speedier progress than we are making in political decisions. We seem very much to be lagging behind. It has become manifestly clear that the margin of error or uncertainty on this very subject has been so considerably reduced that it should really cease to weigh on the scales when the question of inspection or non-inspection is considered.

Dealing with this issue I have to revert again -- and I wish to apologize for doing so -- to the statement of the representative of Italy. Speaking a few minutes ago he stressed the need for control and he linked it with the lack of confidence. I believe that when speaking in this Committee some time ago I made this point already, but I wish to reiterate it this morning: we all know that control is a child of distrust. Excessive control, instead of reducing distrust, increases it, because it creates new complications in the whole scheme. Thus by emphasizing this issue in a way which is not justified we are being made to move in a vicious circle between distrust, increased distrust and lack of confidence.

I think we ought to bear in mind, first of all, the essence of the problem which we face: that is, the risks and dangers of a continuous arms race as against those of an agreement, where there would be very little of the uncertain and very little of the doubtful or the unknown. This, indeed, is reflected in the document which has for some time constituted the basis of our deliberations: the eight Power memorandum (ENDC/28). In this connexion one cannot but fully subscribe to what Mr. Lall, the representative of India, said at our sixty-seventh meeting, referring to the principles contained in that memorandum:

"Those principles stand not only endorsed but also assured of continuing validity by the scientific achievements of the recent past." (ENDC/PV.67, p.27)



(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

What is the situation we face today? We have the eight nation memorandum, but we have also a new document -- General Assembly resolution 1762A (XVII) addressed to the nuclear Powers and to this Committee as a whole. As to that resolution I wish to address myself to two elements, and to draw those elements to the special attention of the Committee.

First, that resolution urges the nuclear Powers here represented:

"... to settle the remaining differences between them in order to achieve agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing by 1 January 1963 ..."

(ENDC/63 - A/RES/1762 (XVII) p.3)

It endorses the eight-nation memorandum as a basis for negotiation which would lead to such an agreement and calls upon the parties concerned to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession in order to reach agreement urgently.

However, should such an agreement not be reached by 1 January 1963, the General Assembly recommends a different type of agreement by which tests in three environments would be unconditionally and definitely prohibited, but underground tests would be covered by interim arrangement.

Keeping in mind all the reservations on this very paragraph 6 of the resolution, reservations which my delegation voiced in the General Assembly, may I comment on its meaning with regard to one aspect only. How is it to be understood? Does it mean that by an interim arrangement these underground tests would be stopped for a limited time only and resumed at a later stage, their prohibition being only of a temporary character? I submit that neither this interpretation of the resolution I have mentioned nor any other implication of a temporary nature for the cessation of tests -- in whatever environment they might take place -- would meet the spirit or the letter of this and other documents.

The resolution itself recommends action aiming at the cessation of all nuclear tests for all time, which is borne out by its other provisions in both the substantive part and the preamble. What I have in mind in particular is paragraph 2 of that resolution to which reference was made earlier this morning; that paragraph makes it clear that tests should cease. In fact, as I said earlier, the resolution refers to the cessation of tests not later than 1 January 1963. This provision in paragraph 2 is to my mind of particular importance. I suggest to members of delegations that it stands on its own feet; it has an existence completely independent of all other paragraphs of the resolution. It is even stronger in its language and more mandatory, for whilst, in relation to the other steps to be taken as

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

provided for by the resolution, the document uses the words "urges", "calls on" and "recommends", we find in connexion with cessation of tests the word "asks". Those who are familiar with United Nations documents know that very rarely does the General Assembly use such strong language. That is why, by this very fact and by the place it occupies within the resolution, by its special character, this provision in paragraph 2 is of particular and I should say of paramount importance. The General Assembly, in other words, asks that all tests cease by the date indicated. Negotiations should of course go on; agreement on details should be reached; but it is the will of the General Assembly -- and, indeed, should be the will of all -- that there be no return to testing after the date of 1 January 1963.

This interpretation I submit to members of delegations today is confirmed by a statement made in the General Assembly by the representative of Indonesia, who stressed that:

"In case agreement cannot be reached by 1 January, paragraph 2 of the draft resolution requests the nuclear Powers to please stop their tests."

(A/C.I/PV.1253, p.18)

It is clear, therefore, to my mind that the General Assembly has requested the unconditional cessation of tests on the date of 1 January 1963. It has done so as a result of its condemnation of all nuclear weapon tests, for in this resolution paragraph 1 condemns all nuclear tests. That is why, I submit, we face here a clear-cut provision which is to be read independently of all other stipulations in the resolution.

Finally, let us not forget that the idea of the cessation of tests by a specific date was born in this very Committee here at this table. It will be recalled that it was the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padillo Nervo, who early in our debates made this very suggestion (ENDC/PV.34, p.17). Its aim and purpose were clear -- to stop all tests unconditionally and to continue negotiations until agreement was reached.

Therefore, this is I suggest one of the vital problems to which we ought to address our attention. The deadline thus provided for ought to be a stimulus to reach agreement.

The other issue I wish to raise this morning concerns the eight-Power joint memorandum. We did spend some time interpreting it prior to the recess of this Committee. Amongst others, members of delegations had to listen to what I had to say on this subject. The question of its implementation has been raised now in a

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

somewhat different way. Some interesting ideas have been expounded. But let me put the following question: is it possible to adopt this document or, indeed, any other document on the subject as an arrangement for a fixed time limit only? Representatives at this Committee have its provisions well in their minds; they know, as I do, how elaborate they are, to meet the crucial question of co-operation of the States concerned. Now, facing the issue of putting an end to all nuclear tests -- and I stress -- for all time, should we and, indeed, can we make all these arrangements for a limited period only? By doing so, I suggest, we shall miss the real issue which we face. Is not this issue as I said earlier, that we have to agree on a definite cessation of tests for all time? Therefore, nothing short of that will do. It was not meant to at the time the memorandum was drafted and submitted for our consideration, nor will it do today. Such an interim arrangement, with the Sword of Damocles hanging over our heads, could not be satisfactory.

One can argue that such arrangements have been carried out in other fields, but they are where issues strictly delimited in time and space are involved. One can have an interim trade arrangement to operate until a wider trade treaty is concluded, or an arrangement for a limited period of time only. But with tests it is entirely different, and I would venture an analogy: one cannot conclude a peace treaty for a limited period of time. It is concluded permanently. One can have an armistice -- an armistice, as provided for by The Hague Conventions of 1907, could at that time be concluded for a limited period of time. This does not hold today; every armistice concluded is permanent and has no limitation in time. Once concluded, it puts an end to all activities with which it is concerned. That is why I believe the same applies to tests. Once their cessation is agreed upon, it must be definite and for all time.

Now, coming back to the issue before us, the eight-nation memorandum, once implemented, is therefore to operate without limitation in time. It is of course possible to adapt or alter its provisions or the provisions of the agreement while it is operating; it will be possible to perfect or improve upon the provisions while they are in force. But there should be no possibility of declaring that it has expired because the alleged time limit has expired. That I submit would be contrary to the mandate entrusted to us.

We could conclude a pactum de contrahendo, a preliminary agreement, but here again it should be guided by the provisions of paragraph 2 of resolution 1762A (XVII). That is in no way contradicted by the provisions contained in paragraph 6 of the said

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

resolution, for also, in relation to them, as I indicated earlier, paragraph 2 is over-riding and, to borrow a very well-known legal expression, I would say that paragraph 2 is higher law with regard to paragraph 6. There should be no room for doubt in this respect.

That being so, I believe we have to take those two documents and reasonably interpret them, interpret them according to their intention and to the rationale of their provisions. We take the memorandum of the eight nations as a basis for a permanent settlement of all the issues involved. Were we to do otherwise we should be acting contrary to its very spirit.

Those are some preliminary remarks on the subject which I submit this morning. But before I close I think I should revert to what I said at the outset of my remarks. We ought to bear in mind that time is running short and calls for urgent action on our part. The possibility of the further continuation of tests is fraught with incalculable danger. It may take us into an unprecedented arms race with all its consequences. That is why the great dilemma, to test or not to test is coming ever closer to the dilemma "to be or not to be"; and I think we have to make it clear where our choice is.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should like to consult the Committee. It is now 13 minutes past one. I have three more speakers on my list, the United Kingdom, Ethiopia and Bulgaria. The representatives of the United Kingdom and of Canada have also asked for the right of reply at this meeting to the statements by the representative of the Soviet Union. I should like to ask the representatives of Ethiopia and Bulgaria whether they would be agreeable to their statements being deferred until our next meeting. I shall also ask the representative of the United Kingdom whether he wishes to speak today in the exercise of his right of reply or whether he wishes to reserve his remarks until the Wednesday meeting.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): It is getting late and I am quite ready to postpone my statement until Wednesday.

Ato ALAMAYEHU (Ethiopia): I also agree to reserve my statement until Wednesday.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): It certainly is not my wish to delay my colleagues round the table here; as the Chairman has pointed out, the hour is getting late. I should therefore like to reserve in the main the remarks I had intended to make to the Committee, in the course of which I wanted to draw one or two thoughts from the very interesting suggestions we have heard from Delegations in our previous meetings.

However, I should like today to make a very short statement in exercise of my right of reply to what we have heard this morning.

First, we have just listened to the representative of Poland. It is always fascinating to see the way in which he seeks to defend an indefensible case. On this occasion it was made much more difficult for him by the speech we had heard earlier, to which I shall revert in a moment. But just one word of reply to the representative of Poland when he sought to analyse the resolution which we passed recently at the General Assembly and to give particular attention to one paragraph which he elevated above others. I will not reply to him in my own words. I will just reply in what I thought were the very wise words of the representative of Sweden, speaking last Wednesday in our debate, when he said:

"This resolution is far too serious to be allowed to become the object of sophisticated disputes of interpretation. Such disputes would be derisory to the hundreds of millions of human beings who stand behind this document. If one looks at the resolution as a whole -- and it should and must be read as a whole -- its purport is crystal clear." (ENDC/PV.84, p.13)

Those are the words surely of Solomon. Certainly I do not need to add to them. So much for the representative of Poland.

Now I come to the representative of the Soviet Union. I want to say quite frankly that I was deeply disappointed by the speech which he made this morning. I thought it was a deplorable speech in every possible sense of the word, and I say that having measured my words carefully. What was he doing? He said in the first place that the differences between the two sides have been narrowed down and what is needed is a few more efforts. Laudable words, had he gone on from there. What he did not mention to us was that the narrowing down has been done entirely from the West and not one iota of it from the Soviet Union, as he knows better than anyone else in this room.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

However, the differences have been narrowed down. But what does he do to try to narrow them further? He starts with a sharp attack on the Western partial treaty, an attack which seemed to me to carry very little conviction, bearing in mind, as one must bear in mind, that the West has put forward this partial treaty not as an end in itself but as a step towards an end, and in that sense I believe it has been welcomed by very many people and would be welcomed by the whole world if the Soviet Union would only accept it in that sense. And in the course of his arguments against it he used some extraordinary words. He talked about certain States using an environment which is more appropriate or more convenient to them for testing. In other words, quite clearly he was thinking in terms of not banning tests in the atmosphere because it was more convenient to the Soviet Union to use the atmosphere. More convenient, yes; but at what harm to people all over the world? We all know there are two distinct aspects of this. There is the harm from fallout and there is the continuation of the arms race. Two entirely separate issues. Both are applicable to atmospheric tests but only one to underground tests. Therefore when he talked of it being more convenient, it seemed to me one could not get much more cynical than that.

The representative of the Soviet Union went on to discuss, amongst other things, the suggestion concerning the use of black boxes. He mentioned that that proposal originated at the Pugwash discussions this year. I understood him to say that it originated from Soviet Union, United States and United Kingdom scientists. In fact, it originated from Soviet Union and United States scientists.

However, the representative of the Soviet Union spoke of this suggestion and how it could lead to some solution. But he did not take the facts as set out by those six eminent scientists who produced the document. As I have a copy of the document here I should like to quote two very short excerpts from it. It reads:

"We have explored the possibility of developing this system in such a way as to provide a minimal interference with the host country and still obtain a maximum amount of completely objective seismic information for the international control commission, so that it will substantially reduce" -- and I should like to emphasize the words "substantially reduce" -- "the number of necessary on-site inspections." (ENDC/66, p.1)

It then goes on to give suggestions as to how the system could be built up. At the end of the document, which is quite a short one, it says:

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

"We think a system developed along these lines may provide a large enough mass of objective seismic data so that the international control commission will need to request very few" -- and I stress the words "very few" -- "on-site inspections." (ibid., p.2)

Those two quotations show quite clearly that it was not the intention of those scientists to suggest for one moment that adopting this proposal would obviate the need for on-site inspection.

The gentlemen who signed that document were: Academician Artsimovitch of the Soviet Union, Professor Riznichenko of the Soviet Union, Academician Tamm of the Soviet Union, Professor Inglis of the United States, Mr. Leghorn of the United States, and Professor Rich also of the United States.

Following on comments about that, one of those signatories, Professor Rich, sent a letter to the New York Times on 18 November. It is a fairly long letter and I will therefore read just one short extract from it. He said:

"In the original proposal it was suggested that the instruments would be installed by the host country and then periodically turned over to an international control commission for inspection and repair. If such a system can be perfected and made 'tamper-proof', then it might decrease the number of necessary on-site inspections which the international control commission would request.

"However, we did not suggest in our proposal that the use of these automatic stations would eliminate the necessity of on-site inspections, as has been implied by several recent newspaper articles." (ibid., p.3)

In view of the seriousness of this matter, and the way in which this has been distorted, I would formally ask that both these documents be circulated as Conference documents. I have done this in order to clarify the position, because we must be clear about it.

I would say to the representative of the Soviet Union that we are willing to investigate with him this black box proposal. We have invited him before now to discuss it with us in the Sub-Committee. We are willing to investigate it with him precisely on the proposals as put forward by his own scientists. Does he agree with his own scientists or not? Does he agree with his own scientists that in fact there will be a need for some necessary on-site inspection, or does he not? If he does not, is this the reason why the Soviet Union has been so careful not to agree to the holding of meetings of scientists from both sides? I think that this does require a clear answer from the representative of the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The representative of the Soviet Union said at one stage that if the call put forward at Pugwash was adopted it would lead to a solution. (supra, p.35) I say to him that I am willing to adopt this and to work it out on the basis suggested by those scientists. I ask the representative of the Soviet Union whether he is ready, too.

There is one last point which I should like to raise. The representative of the Soviet Union referred to resolution 1762A (XVII) and in particular to operative paragraph 6, which has aroused so much comment and attention. He made the point that the Soviet Union voted against that paragraph, in company, I think he said, with a number of other States. Let us get our facts straight. Which were those other States?

According to my records the States which voted against it were as follows: the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, Byelo-russia, Outer Mongolia, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania and Cuba.

On the other hand, not only did the Western States vote for it but I think I am right in saying that almost all of the authors of the eight-Power joint memorandum (ENDC/28) also voted for it. Therefore, this paragraph was a genuine attempt to find a bridge between the two positions. Everybody knows that efforts were made in order to get the exact wording; and I still believe that it does provide the best hope for progress.

That is why I feel so bitter this morning after hearing the representative of the Soviet Union denounce it and say in effect to all those round this table who in the last few days have tried to hard to find some basis of agreement, "Keep off; the Soviet Union will have nothing to do with it." That is what he is saying to them all. This is why I say it is so deplorable.

I would have thought that we had an opportunity here to try to build a bridge; and here it has been rejected out of hand once more by the Soviet Union. I think that this is a very serious matter indeed. It is no good minimizing it.

I still hope that the Soviet Union will think better of this. I hope that, although there has been this immediate reaction, it will have some further thoughts and that it will approach us in a more realistic light. I cannot help but feel that the representative of the Soviet Union has made a very sad move indeed this morning.



(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I should like to raise one further small point with the representative of the Soviet Union. He talked about the dangers of having a short, interim arrangement. Dangers there may be. There are dangers in every respect here. However, he said in regard to this, if I noted his words aright:

"We are well enough informed to know that this is precisely the length of time required to prepare a new series of nuclear tests." (supra, p. 34)

How well the Soviet Union knows. Yes indeed. Here is the first free indication we have had from the Soviet Union that when it was negotiating with us and our United States colleagues in the summer of 1961 it was using its time to good effect in preparing that massive series of tests which it then carried out.

However, putting that on one side, I should like to look at the events in this period from another angle and say to the representative of the Soviet Union: "Maybe there is this opportunity; but there is also the fact that if during that trial period, whatever period of time it may be, the Soviet Union did have to endure a very small number -- and it would be a very small number in six months -- of on-site inspections, is that something so very terrible?" Does the representative of the Soviet Union really tell us that those two, three or four on-site inspections in six months would make any difference to Soviet security arrangements? I am inclined to suspect that if only the Soviet Union would try this it would find this idea not nearly so bad as it seems to envisage. If the Soviet Union did undertake this during a short six-month period it would be running very little risk. If the Soviet Union then found this system to be tolerable we could then continue with it. But the only alternative must be for the Soviet Union, if it claims to have this information which makes on-site inspection unnecessary, to provide this information to us.

The representative of Poland said that gigantic strides have been made in modern science in recent months. All right. We agree. Our draft treaties that we prepared and put forward were based on the latest of our strides. We now ask the Soviet Union to produce their strides and so help us to conclude an agreement. If the Soviet Union is right in what it has told us then we could possibly conclude one on its terms, but if it will not in fact show us what its advances are, how can we do so?

That is all I want to say today. I apologize for having kept the Committee for a little longer than I intended, but I did feel it necessary to respond to what I thought was a damaging and unconstructive speech. I only hope that our Soviet colleague will have better news for us on a further occasion.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Soviet representative did the Canadian delegation the honour of criticizing rather extensively the ideas which were put forward in our statement of last Friday (ENDC/FV.85, pp.12 et seq). We shall study and reply to these criticisms if we think that, in so doing, we can help to forward the work of this Committee in reaching some agreement.

However, I feel it necessary to reply at this time in order to rebut what I took to be the suggestion that the Canadian delegation was not in favour of a treaty to ban tests in all environments for all time, if it can be arrived at. I believe that if the Soviet representative examines our speech again he will see quite clearly that we said that anything less than a comprehensive treaty would be a second best. Paragraph 6, of resolution 1762 A (XVII), which was put forward strictly as an alternative, and something to be done if full agreement could not be reached, appears to us -- as it seems to appear to a number of other delegations on this Committee -- to offer the most helpful way to proceed at the present time, because we do not see, to our regret, in the statements which have been made by the representative of the Soviet Union, any attempt to negotiate in the spirit of mutual understanding and concession so necessary if we are to reach agreement. In fact, we do not think that the Soviet representative's interpretation of our statements shows exactly a mutual understanding. We have listened carefully and we can see no signs of a concession from the Soviet side.

The Soviet representative, in his remarks, mentioned the spirit of constructive compromise. We feel that the Soviet Union's position, as shown here, is that it is perfectly willing to compromise constructively providing the compromise is based on acceptance of the whole Soviet Union position as set forth on 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11), in other words, on accepting the whole animal -- I might say, the whole hog, bones, meat, hide and bristles. We would hope at some time to hear something a little more in the nature of what we would consider to be a compromise.

The Canadian delegation had its unhappiness at being singled out for this criticism somewhat alleviated by what I took to be the association of the delegations of Mexico and India with the Canadian delegation as being those who seemed to be giving to the debate a turn which does not quite meet the ideas of the Soviet representative. We are happy to be associated with the other people mentioned in giving to this debate the direction that it has taken.

Mr. LALL (India): I have just a few words to say in exercising my right of reply. The Soviet representative was passionately in favour of banning all tests for all time, and he was against the idea of a short-term arrangement. I should like to make it quite clear that the statement we made was one which could be applied equally to a permanent test ban or to one for a shorter period.

We mentioned a shorter period simply because we thought that that might be easier for the two sides as a starting point -- that it would help them to embark upon this process. If, on the other hand, the two sides would prefer a permanent arrangement, taking into account the observations which we made, we ourselves would much prefer a permanent cessation of all nuclear testing in any acceptable way, whether taking into account our observations or other observations, or any other arrangements on which the two sides could agree.

We, therefore, wish to make it very clear that our remarks must not be taken as asking for a limited period test ban. On the other hand, if we mentioned a limited period it was only because we thought that that might make it easier. We ourselves favour a permanent test ban.

Secondly, on paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 A (XVII), may I mention that we deleted -- by "we" I mean those who were engaged in the process of negotiation -- certain words in that paragraph which were to the effect that the interim arrangement should be for a limited period. It is true, and it is only fair to say, that those words "for a limited period" were deleted in the course of the negotiation, and our understanding of the words "accompanied by an interim arrangement" were that this arrangement would be a provisional one until a final arrangement could be found, but not one limited to a certain period; it would be provisional in the sense that while it was in force the efforts to find a final arrangement would continue and these arrangements would be given effect to as soon as they were agreed upon.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I wish to make a few remarks by way of reply. In his statement the representative of the United Kingdom confirmed the fears which we have already expressed that an interim agreement contains within itself the danger that it may lead to the resumption of nuclear weapon tests and to the resumption of the armaments race in this direction. He himself confirmed this, and there is no need for any further clarification.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

My second remark concerns the Pugwash Conference. I must say that however eloquently the representative of the United Kingdom tried to catch the Soviet representative out in something, the fact remains that the Pugwash Conference of scientists which took place in London three months ago did not formulate any concrete official proposals. At that Conference they discussed and put forward the idea of the possibility of using automatic stations in order to increase the effectiveness of control. That is what we are talking about here, and I fail to understand what the representative of the United Kingdom was seeking to find in my statement when he tried to compare something or other and to discover some sort of contradiction in our position. There are no contradictions. We are speaking about the idea; I have twice repeated that we are prepared to take advantage of the idea which was discussed at the Pugwash Conference.

My third remark is this. The representative of the United Kingdom attacked me and even went so far as to use the word "cynicism".

Where did he see cynicism? In our having said that, as everyone realizes, the United States intends under its partial treaty to retain the possibility of conducting nuclear weapon tests underground. We drew attention to the circumstance that if underground nuclear weapon tests were to continue, then other States might also conduct nuclear weapon tests. The environment in which they would be conducted is of little importance from the fundamental aspect of the matter, and the fundamental aspect of the matter is that the nuclear arms race and the development of nuclear weapons would continue. For what purpose? You speak of cynicism, Mr. Godber, but you do not see it where it is. We should indeed speak of cynicism when people oppose the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, because nuclear weapons are being prepared for the destruction of millions and millions of human lives. And if this were to happen, no one would be likely to say: "Oh, what a blessing for humanity that we carried out nuclear tests underground and not in the atmosphere, because tests in the atmosphere affect heredity in some way, whereas underground tests do not". What heredity will there be after tens or even hundreds of millions of people have been annihilated as a result of nuclear war? The cynicism is in the position you maintain, Mr. Godber, and not in our insisting on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests.

With regard to the remarks made by the representative of Canada, I can only say that we accepted the memorandum of the non-aligned countries as a basis. We consider that we have made a big concession, because this proposal of the non-aligned countries is a compromise. We accepted this compromise immediately. The memorandum

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

was submitted on 16 April and on 19 April -- that is, three days later -- we officially stated that we accepted the proposal of the non-aligned States (ENDC/PV.24, pp.10-11). We accepted this compromise platform as a basis for negotiation and even as a basis for an agreement. Was this not a step, a huge step towards meeting the position of the Western Powers? After all, what is laid down in the memorandum of the non-aligned countries is not the position of the Soviet Union. It contains no bones, meat or bristles, as you say, of our proposal.

Therefore, by accepting the memorandum of the non-aligned countries we accepted a compromise proposal. But what are you doing? You are still standing on your old position; you demand obligatory inspection and the establishment of an international control system. On this basis there can be no agreement. Therefore you are against an agreement. We shall never stop accusing you of this until you come to an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis. What does the neutrals' memorandum mean from the point of view of principle? From the point of view of principle the neutrals' memorandum means, firstly, the acceptance of national systems as the means of control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of tests and, secondly, the renunciation of obligatory inspection.

That is what the neutrals' memorandum means. But you accept the first principle of the neutrals' memorandum only in words, whereas in fact you continue to advocate international control; and you reject altogether the second principle. Of course, if we are going to conduct negotiations in that way, we shall never have any agreement.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I understand that the delegations of the United Kingdom, Ethiopia and Bulgaria will be inscribed in that order on the list of speakers for our meeting on Wednesday, there having not been time to hear their statements today.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-sixth plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Dean, representative of the United States of America.

"All the representatives made statements of congratulation and good wishes to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on his election. The Conference decided to address an appropriate telegram to the Secretary-General.

"Statements were also made by the representatives of Burma, the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom, Canada and India.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 5 December 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.